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Abstract  
It is noted that utilization of AFTA is low by international standards. In order to clarify the 
reasons for such low utilization, this paper investigates what kinds of Japanese affiliates in 
ASEAN are more likely to use FTAs in their exporting, by employing unique affiliate-level data. 
Our findings are as follow. First, the larger the affiliate is, or the more diversified its 
procurements’ origins are, the more likely it is to utilize an FTA scheme in its exporting. Second, 
affiliates exporting actively to developing countries are more likely to use FTAs than those 
exporting to developed countries. Third, there are clear differences in FTA utilization depending 
on affiliates’ locations and sectors. These results afford a clue to the reasons for the low FTA 
utilization in East Asia. 
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1. Introduction 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) have proliferated in East Asia. Currently, there are 
more than thirty Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) enforced involving East Asia, of 
which fourteen are intra-regional. Regionalism in East Asia has been led by ASEAN in 
particular; the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) is an agreement that will eliminate 
import duties on all products placed in the normal track in the ASEAN-6 (Brunei, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand). The new member 
countries, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam, will also eliminate tariffs in the 
normal track by 2015. Furthermore, regionalism in the ASEAN+6 region is 
exacerbating the hub-and-spoke FTA structure with ASEAN as the hub and other East 
Asian countries as the spokes; currently, a total of six ASEAN+1 FTAs are enforced or 
are under negotiation.1 
However, such proliferation does not automatically increase the number of 
international transactions that utilize FTA schemes. In reality, all firms do not 
necessarily use the FTA scheme in their exporting or importing. Administrative costs for 
securing certificates of origin (COO), which certify that the exported goods were locally 
produced, play a key role in firms’ choice to use FTAs. In order to secure the COO for 
the goods they export, firms must prepare all documents required by the investigating 
authorities. Since such document preparation entails work that creates fixed costs, only 
firms that earn adequate operating profits to cover the fixed costs will choose to use an 
FTA scheme. In East Asia, there has been a tendency toward incremental increase in the 
number of FTAs which feature so-called rules of origin (ROO) that adopt the optional 
criterion or change in tariff classification criterion as criteria to determine the origin of 
goods.2 On the other hand, the “third-party certificate system” is often adopted as a 
procedure to certify origin; this is a system wherein third parties such as a relevant 
ministry or a chamber of commerce take a role in issuing a certificate of origin after 
reviewing applications filed by firms.3 Such ROO and procedures to certify origin result 
in a certain amount of fixed costs for firms using FTAs. 
                                                 
1 In this paper, FTA, RTA, and Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) are used interchangeably. 
2 There are four main types of criteria to determine the origin of goods: 1) the value-added content 
criterion, 2) the change in tariff classification criterion, 3) the optional criterion that allows firms a 
choice of whether to use the value-added content criterion or the change in tariff classification 
criterion, and 4) the dual criterion which requires firms to use both the value-added content criterion 
and the change in tariff classification criterion. For details of each criterion, see the WTO website. 
3 There are three main procedures to certify the origin of goods: 1) the third-party certificate system, 
2) the self-certificate system, and 3) a hybrid system of third-party certification and self-certification. 
For details of each system, see the WTO website. 
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Particularly in East Asia, it is noted that the rate of FTA utilization remains at a 
fairly low level. Hiratsuka et al. (2008) point out that, to begin with, Japanese firms and 
their affiliates operating in ASEAN are not well aware of FTAs. The utilization of AFTA 
measured by the ratio of AFTA administrative records to total exports was low, at 
around 15% to 20%, during the period 2003-06. The utilization rate on the import side 
was around 11% to 16%, lower than the corresponding rate for the export side. 
Furthermore, the utilization of AFTA observed for both exports and imports is low by 
international standards. Kohpaiboon (2008) pointed out that the AFTA utilization rates 
were lower than those of NAFTA; the NAFTA utilization rate by Mexican exports to the 
United States was around 60% in 2004-05. The utilization rate by Chilean exports to the 
United States was around 55% to 56% in 2005-06 (James 2006).  
Against this backdrop, the aim of this paper is to clarify the reasons for the low 
rate of FTA utilization in East Asia by investigating what kinds of Japanese affiliates in 
ASEAN are more likely to use FTAs in their exporting. To the best of our knowledge, 
there are few previous studies investigating such firms’ attributes, perhaps due to the 
limited data.4 There are three important trial papers. Kohpaiboon (2008) analyzed AFTA 
implementation by Thai exporters for the period 2003-06, by using AFTA administrative 
records (collected by the Bureau of Preferential Trade, Department of Foreign Trade, 
Ministry of Commerce). He found that large conglomerate firms or firms in industries 
with a thin margin between general and preferential tariff rates tend to utilize the AFTA 
scheme. While Kohpaiboon (2008) presents sector-level analysis (HS four-digit), 
Takahashi and Urata (2008, 2009) examine FTA usage by Japanese firms at the firm 
level by means of a questionnaire survey. Their findings are as follow. First, large firms 
are more likely to use FTA schemes, as found by Kohpaiboon (2008) at the sector level. 
Second, firms with close trade and FDI relationships with FTA partner countries tend to 
use FTA schemes. 
In this paper, we employ a unique dataset. The Japan External Trade Organization 
(JETRO) has carried out an ongoing survey of Japanese affiliates operating in Asia for 
22 years, since 1987. The survey was initially targeted at manufacturing companies, but 
in the wake of the growth of the service sector, inclusion of non-manufacturing 
companies began in 2007 (the 21st survey). The survey, named the “Survey of 
Japanese-Affiliated Firms in ASEAN, India, and Oceania,” has included questions on 
the affiliates’ FTA use particularly in the last three years. For example, it asks whether 
or not the affiliate currently uses any existing bilateral/multilateral FTAs or EPAs for 
                                                 
4 The impact of FTA on trade is often evaluated by estimating the well-known gravity equation. See, 
for example, Endoh (1999) and Baier and Bergstrand (2007). 
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import or export activities. In the survey, moreover, the basic information on affiliates’ 
activities, such as the breakdown of their export destinations and their procurement 
sources, is also collected. Therefore, this survey enables us to explore more 
characteristics which affect affiliates’ FTA usage than did the previous surveys. 
Particularly in this paper, we mainly examine those attributes of firms which encourage 
use of FTAs in exporting. Such detailed analyses will contribute to the enhancement of 
our understanding of the mechanics of firms’ FTA use. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces our dataset and 
presents an overview of Japanese affiliates’ FTA use in Asia. In Section 3, we present 
our hypotheses on the relationship between firms’ characteristics and their FTA use. Our 
empirical framework for examining such hypotheses is presented in Section 4. The 
empirical results are reported in Section 5, and our conclusion is presented in Section 6. 
 
 
2. The Utilization of FTAs by Japanese Affiliates in East Asia 
Employing the 22nd survey, this section introduces the usage of FTAs by Japanese 
affiliates. The survey, which was sent to 5,107 Japanese affiliates operating in the above 
thirteen countries, received 1,852 valid responses (36.3%). Of these, 1,354 were from 
ASEAN7 countries, 235 from Southeast Asia (SE Asia), and 263 from Oceania. 
Although our main analysis presented in the following sections is devoted to usage of 
the FTAs for exporting in ASEAN, this section also refers, for the sake of completeness, 
to usage of FTAs for importing in ASEAN, SE Asia, and Oceania. We first examine 
FTA use in exporting and then in importing. Bottlenecks in firms’ FTA use are also 
noted.  
Table 1 reports Japanese affiliates’ use of FTAs in exporting by their location. 
From this table, we can see that 23.0% of Japanese affiliates with export operations in 
ASEAN nations take advantage of FTAs. The highest level of FTA usage is in 
Singapore (43.2%), followed by Indonesia (35.9%), and Thailand (22.5%). In contrast, 
in the Philippines and Vietnam, the ratio is around 10%. When we combine “already 
using” and “considering use” scores, the resulting shares for “firms interested in 
FTA/EPA” add up to 46.3%, nearly half, for ASEAN as a whole. High scorers include 
Singapore (59.1%), Indonesia (55.5%), and Thailand (49.6%). 
 
===   Table 1   === 
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Let us take a look at exporters’ use of particular FTAs when ASEAN members are 
signatories (Table 2). The table reports only the agreements for which we have valid 
answers from 20 or more firms and usage rates of 5% or more. The most widely used 
FTA around the Pacific Rim is Singapore’s AFTA. Of Japanese manufacturing firms in 
Singapore, 31.8% make use of this agreement. The next most commonly used 
agreement, at 21.7%, is JIEPA, the EPA concluded between Japan and Indonesia. JIEPA 
went into effect in July 2008, and despite the fact that this survey was conducted only 
four months later, one firm in five was already utilizing it. The third most commonly 
used agreement, utilized by 18.2% of Japanese firms in Singapore, is ACFTA, the 
ASEAN-China FTA. 
 
===   Table 2   === 
 
The JETRO survey also asks firms about their reasons for not utilizing 
FTAs/EPAs, and the results are reported in Table 3. The leading reason in the ASEAN 
region is that “importers are exempted from tariffs” (123 firms, 37.6%). As mentioned 
later, this also becomes a major reason for not using FTAs in importing. The second 
reason is that “there are no FTAs/EPAs with the countries to which we export” (75 firms, 
22.9%). Third, some companies state that “tariffs are already low in the countries to 
which we export” (65 firms, 19.9%). As mentioned in the introductory section, when 
exporters make use of FTAs, they must secure the COO, which entails an unavoidable 
additional cost burden for certificate issuance, personnel, and processing. Thus, as 
explored in the next section, only when the preferential tariff margin gained by using an 
FTA/EPA is greater than such burden will firms consider utilizing FTAs. Indeed, of the 
390 manufacturing firms in Asia and Oceania, the largest proportion (28.2%) state that 
they would consider using an FTA with a preferential tariff margin in the 3% to 5% 
range (according to the 22nd Survey of Japanese-Affiliated Firms in ASEAN, India, and 
Oceania). 
 
===   Table 3   === 
 
Turning to imports, we see in Table 1 that 19.7% of Japanese affiliates with 
import operations in ASEAN nations utilize FTAs for imports, slightly less than the 
23.0% for exports. Use of FTAs for imports is especially prevalent in Oceania (33.3%), 
and next come firms doing business in Indonesia (28.7%) and Thailand (25.3%). 
Combining firms considering making use of FTAs with firms already taking advantage 
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of FTAs, we see a slightly different result, with the proportion rising to about 45% for 
ASEAN as a whole. Table 4 reports that the agreement most often utilized is JIEPA, the 
Japan-Indonesia FTA, at 17%, followed by Japan’s EPA with Malaysia and Thailand. 
Thus, the top three are EPAs with Japan, and most of the other agreements are within 
the ASEAN Free Trade Area.  
 
===   Table 4   === 
 
As shown in Table 5, the leading reason why FTAs are neither employed nor 
considered in importing is that, in the ASEAN region, investment incentive schemes 
have already eliminated tariffs, and this reason is cited by 157 (48.9%) of the 351 firms 
that responded to the question. Actually in many ASEAN countries, incentives to 
promote inbound investment reduce or eliminate tariffs on materials or parts imported 
for assembly and exported as finished products. In these cases, there is no need to make 
use of FTAs/EPAs. Other reasons mentioned include “low levies on products sold 
domestically” (13.4%) and “no FTAs/EPAs with the countries from which we import” 
(13.1%). 
 
===   Table 5   === 
 
 
3. Hypotheses 
     This section presents our hypotheses, which are empirically tested in the 
following sections, on what kinds of firms use an FTA scheme in their exporting. For 
firms to use an FTA in exporting, two conditions must be satisfied. One is that the total 
profit from using the FTA must be greater than from not using it. If firms choose to use 
an FTA scheme, then they can export their products with the FTA preferential tariff 
rates, which are mostly zero percent. Otherwise, they must pay the general tariff rates, 
which are mostly most-favored nation rates (MFN rates). Use of the FTA scheme, 
however, will incur a certain level of administrative costs as mentioned in the 
introductory section, which become additional fixed costs for the companies. Therefore, 
for firms to use FTAs, it is necessary that the margin between FTA rates and general 
rates be sufficiently large compared with the additional fixed costs, i.e., administrative 
costs. This argument leads immediately to the following testable hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Firms that export to countries with the lower general tariff rates are less 
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likely to use FTAs. 
 
Another condition is that total profits in the case of FTA use must be 
non-negative. That is, firms’ operating profits have to exceed the fixed costs, including 
the above-mentioned administrative costs. While the low preferential tariff rates 
increase the operating profits, there are also general elements affecting them. 
 
Hypothesis 2. The more productive firms are more likely to use FTAs in their exporting. 
 
If firms’ products are well differentiated, their operating profits are positively related to 
their productivity (see, for example, Baldwin et al., 2003, Appendix 2.A). Therefore, 
firms with high productivity can afford to pay administrative costs and are thus likely to 
use an FTA scheme. 
 
Hypothesis 3. The more diversified the origins of firms’ procurements are, the more 
likely the firms are to use FTAs in their exporting. 
 
This is the well-known love-of-variety nature in the procurement of intermediate 
products. Suppose that intermediate products are differentiated, and further, that firms 
prefer more varieties of intermediate products; the diversified origins of firms’ 
procurements lowers their input costs, resulting in the higher operating profits. In 
addition to this benefit from the horizontal nature of procurement, its diversified origins 
may yield benefits from vertical division of labor, i.e., international fragmentation.5 
That is, input costs are lowered by sourcing each intermediate product from a country 
with location advantages in producing it. In sum, the more diversified the origins of 
firms’ procurements are, the lower their input costs are, and thus the larger their 
operating profits are. However, more diversified origins might substantially raise the 
administrative costs for FTA use. In certifying that the exported goods were locally 
produced, exporters must prepare a list of materials inputted for producing them. To 
complete the list, exporters need to request each materials supplier to issue an invoice or 
contract documents. Thus, higher document preparation costs are obviously entailed in 
sourcing materials from a larger number of suppliers. As a result, highly diversified 
                                                 
5 For a theoretical analysis on international fragmentation, see Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001) and 
Cheng and Kierzkowski (2001). For an empirical investigation on fragmentation in East Asia, see 
Kimura (2006). 
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origins of procurements could result in fixed costs large enough to discourage firms 
from using an FTA scheme. 
 
 
4. Empirical Framework 
This section explains the methodology used to investigate the three hypotheses 
presented in the previous section. The source of our data for estimation, as noted in 
Section 2, is the “Survey of Japanese-Affiliated Firms in ASEAN, India, and Oceania” 
for 2006, 2007, and 2008. For our empirical analysis, we specify our index function as: 
Γi = xi’β0 + εi, where εi ~ N(0, 1) and xi = (Exporti, Scalei, Variancei). 
Γi is the difference in affiliate i’s total profits when comparing cases of FTA use and 
non-use (a time script is omitted). The observation rule for affiliate i is formalized as: 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
≥Γ
<Γ
=
01
00
i
i
i
if
if
y
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where yj is an indicator variable taking unity if affiliate j uses an FTA scheme in 
exporting and zero otherwise. As a result, our probability model by the probit is given 
by: 
Pr (yi =1| xi) = Φ (xi’β), 
where Φ(•) is the standard cumulative normal probability distribution. From our sample, 
we exclude the affiliates that answered “considering use” for the data item of FTA use in 
exporting because of their ambiguous standpoint in the choice of FTA use. 
We introduce three kinds of affiliate characteristic variables. First, we examine 
the impact of the margin between FTA and general tariff rates in the countries to which 
affiliates export their products (Hypothesis 1). To this end, three kinds of FTAs in which 
a significant number of ASEAN countries are included as members are taken into 
consideration. Specifically, we introduce a vector Export, of which the elements are 
shares of exports to the other ASEAN countries (AFTA), exports to China 
(ASEAN-China FTA), and exports to Japan (bilateral FTA with Japan), in total sales. 
For example, since general tariff rates are already low in Japan, all other things being 
equal, affiliates which export mainly to Japan will not be likely to use an FTA scheme. 
On the other hand, those which export to China are obviously expected to use it, due to 
their high general tariff rates. 
Second, we examine Hypothesis 2 by introducing Scalei, which is a log of total 
employment. Our dataset does not have any convincing productivity measures, i.e., 
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value-added and so on, and even total sales are not available. From the theoretical point 
of view, firms’ productivity is not necessarily related positively to their employment; 
however, from the empirical point of view, the productivity (TFP) usually has a positive 
correlation with the total employment (see, for example, Fukao and Kwon, 2006). Thus, 
the use of employment as a proxy for productivity may be plausible to some extent. As a 
result, the larger the affiliates’ scale, the more likely they would be to utilize an FTA 
scheme. 
Next, in order to explore Hypothesis 3, we introduce Variancei, which captures a 
variety of sources of intermediate inputs. Our dataset has the shares of local 
procurement, imports from other ASEAN countries, imports from Japan, imports from 
other Asian countries excluding ASEAN and Japan, imports from the US, imports from 
Europe, and imports from other countries. The variable Variancei is constructed as a 
variance among the above seven categories. The love-of-variety nature of intermediate 
products and the benefits from vertical division of labor reduce affiliates’ input costs. 
This reduction leads to higher operating profits and thus the positive estimator in 
Variancei. On the other hand, if the diversified sources of inputs result in a remarkable 
rise in the administrative costs for FTA use, the coefficient for Variancei may be 
estimated to be negative. 
So far, we have not taken care of the ROO explicitly in the previous sections. As 
mentioned before, for the sake of FTA use, affiliates must secure the ROO of their 
goods. In order to control the extent of restrictiveness of ROO, we introduce both 
country fixed effects and sector fixed effects (or country-sector fixed effects) because 
the ROO differs according to not only FTAs but also sectors. Several other elements are 
also controlled by such fixed effects, such as differences in wages among countries, 
which affect firms’ operating profits. The differences in efficiency in obtaining the COO 
among countries are also captured by the estimates of the fixed effects. Moreover, those 
may include the differences in general tariff rates among sectors. 
Before reporting estimation results, we should eliminate certain kinds of affiliates 
from our sample. First of all, we restrict our sample only to exporting affiliates because 
affiliates are unable to use FTA if they do not export.6 One may say that affiliates should 
be further excluded if they do not export to countries that have concluded FTAs with 
their host countries. To put it the other way around, affiliates should not be included if 
they export only to countries that have not concluded FTAs with their host countries. 
The robustness checks on this issue are conducted later. 
                                                 
6 We also conduct some data cleaning. For example, we eliminate observations in which the sum of 
export shares plus the share of the supply to the local market exceeds 100%. 
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5. Empirical Results 
     In this section, we report the results of our empirical analyses. Basic statistics are 
provided in Table 6, and our probit results are presented in Table 7. The columns (I) and 
(II) in Table 7 show our baseline results, which are basically consistent with our 
expectations. The former includes country fixed effects and sector fixed effects 
separately, while the latter includes the country-sector fixed effects.  
 
===   Tables 6 &7   === 
 
     There are three points that are noteworthy. First, coefficients for Scale are 
estimated to be significantly positive, indicating that the larger the affiliate, the more 
likely it is to utilize an FTA scheme in its exporting. This result is consistent with that in 
Takahashi and Urata (2008, 2009). Second, coefficients for Variance are estimated to be 
significantly negative, showing benefits from the love-of-variety in inputs and/or from 
vertical division of labor exceed the rise in the administrative costs due to the diversion 
of procurement origins. In particular, it is interesting that firms which are actively 
engaged in international fragmentation are likely to use an FTA scheme in their 
exporting. Third, coefficients for export shares are all estimated to be significant and 
show an interesting order in their magnitude. The largest magnitude can be found in the 
coefficient for ExCHINA, while the lowest magnitude in that for ExJAPAN. As a result, 
we can say that firms exporting actively to developing countries are more likely to use 
FTAs than those exporting to developed countries. Furthermore, this order is consistent 
with the order in general tariff rates. In China, for example, since the tariff margin is 
large, affiliates can enjoy large benefits from using an FTA scheme in their exporting to 
China.  
The results of fixed effects in the estimation of column (I) might be worth 
reporting particularly for policy makers. Column (I) in Table 8 reports the results of 
country fixed effects. We find that affiliates in the Philippines and Vietnam are less 
likely to utilize FTA schemes, while the most active use of FTA is found in affiliates in 
Singapore. Due to the fact that Singapore provides the most efficient procedures for 
obtaining the COO, these results might suggest that such procedures in the Philippines 
and Vietnam are more cumbersome than those in other ASEAN countries.7 The results 
                                                 
7 Also, this may reflect only the availability of FTA schemes for affiliates. Indeed, Singapore has 
concluded the largest number of FTAs among ASEAN countries, while there are relatively few FTAs 
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of sector fixed effects are reported in column (I) in Table 9. From this table, we can see 
that FTAs are less likely to be utilized in electric parts and components and precision 
machinery. This result is most likely due to the low general tariff rates in those sectors. 
Indeed, the general tariff rates for most IT products are low or zero under the 
Information Technology Agreement (ITA). 
 
===   Tables 8 & 9   === 
 
We conduct some robustness checks. First, as mentioned before, affiliates are 
excluded if they do not export to countries that conclude FTAs with their host countries. 
Here, we again pay attention only to three kinds of FTAs; AFTA, ASEAN-China FTA, 
and bilateral FTAs with Japan. Specifically, we restrict our sample only to affiliates with 
positive exports to other ASEAN countries or China. Furthermore, affiliates in 
Singapore and Malaysia are also included if they export to Japan. Affiliates in Thailand 
and Indonesia are not excluded if they have positive exports to Japan in 2008.  
The results produced by these restricted samples are reported in columns (III) and 
(IV) in Table 7. The coefficients for Scale and Variance are again significantly estimated 
with the expected signs. However, the results in export shares show little change. In 
particular, the coefficients for ExASEAN turn out to be insignificant. The results of 
fixed effects in (III) are reported in the corresponding columns in Tables 8 and 9, and 
the result in Vietnam is insignificant. Affiliates in the automobile industry are likely to 
use an FTA scheme in their exporting. Since there remain relatively high general tariff 
rates on automobiles, the contrasting results between electric parts and automobiles 
supports our previous view that results in the sector dummy depend heavily on the level 
of general tariff rates. 
Second, in addition to such restrictions, we further take care of investment 
incentive schemes. As mentioned in Section 2, the major reason for not utilizing FTAs 
in ASEAN is that “importers are exempted from tariffs” (37.6%). If affiliates’ trading 
partners enjoy investment incentive schemes, such affiliates do not need to use FTAs in 
their exporting. Furthermore, such importers’ use of the incentive schemes is mostly out 
of the control of the exporters. Thus, such affiliates are dropped from our sample for the 
analysis of the exporters’ choice of FTA use. To this end, we use the data item on 
“reasons for not using FTAs,” and we drop affiliates that answered “tariffs are exempted 
in the importer side” for that item. 
                                                                                                                                               
in the Philippines and Vietnam compared with other ASEAN countries in the sample. 
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The results are reported in columns (V) and (VI) in Table 7. Scale and Variance 
have qualitatively the same results as before. The significant estimates in ExASEAN 
would indicate that active use of investment incentive schemes in ASEAN leads to the 
underestimation of the coefficients for ExASEAN in columns (III) and (IV); however, 
the magnitude in ExASEAN is still lower than that in ExJAPAN. This may be due to the 
inclusion of exports to Singapore, where general tariff rates, being zero for almost all 
products, are lower than those in Japan. The results of fixed effects in (V) are reported 
in the corresponding columns in Tables 8 and 9. Two points are noteworthy here. First, 
there is the robust result that affiliates in the Philippines are less likely to use an FTA 
scheme. Second, active use of investment incentive schemes in ASEAN leads to the 
underestimation of the fixed effect’s estimate in the automobile parts sector. Similarly, 
the estimate in electric parts decreases remarkably, but it is still negatively significant 
due to the low tariffs in the sector. These results imply that investment incentive 
schemes play an alternative role in the choice of FTA use. 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
It is noted that utilization of AFTA is low by international standards. In order to 
clarify the reasons for such low utilization, this paper investigates what kinds of 
Japanese affiliates in ASEAN are more likely to use FTAs in their exporting. For this 
purpose, we employ a unique dataset from a survey of Japanese affiliates operating in 
Asia conducted by the Japan External Trade Organization. Our findings are as follow. 
First, the larger the affiliate is, or the more diversified the origins of its procurements, 
the more likely it is to utilize an FTA scheme in its exporting. Second, affiliates that 
export actively to developing countries are more likely to use FTAs than those exporting 
to developed countries. Third, there are clear differences in FTA utilization depending 
affiliates’ locations and sectors. 
These results suggest some reasons why FTA utilization in East Asia is low by 
international standards. One reason is the existence of fixed costs, for example the 
administrative costs due to the cumbersome procedures for obtaining the COO. The 
significant results in Scale and Variance imply the existence of a certain level of such 
fixed costs. If fixed costs are high in ASEAN compared to other regions, this would 
constitute a reason for low utilization of FTAs. Another reason is that the major trade in 
ASEAN is in electric parts and components, for which general tariff rates are already 
low. Consequently, it is obviously important for governments, particularly in the 
Philippines, to reduce the fixed costs entailed in FTA use. Moreover, the results in 
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Variance highlight the importance of reducing the service link costs, such as time 
consumed by customs formalities. The reduction of service link costs is one key to the 
development of international fragmentation, which encourages firms to utilize FTA 
schemes.  
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Table 1. Utilization of FTAs 
Use Intend No intention Use Intend No intention
to use to use to use to use
ASEAN 23.0 23.3 53.7 19.7 24.4 55.9
Indonesia 35.9 19.6 44.6 28.7 29.8 41.5
Singapore 43.2 15.9 40.9
Thailand 22.5 27.1 50.4 25.3 26.9 47.8
Philippines 11.8 24.5 63.7 8.0 19.3 72.7
Vietnam 9.4 26.6 64.1 12.5 25.0 62.5
Malaysia 23.8 17.8 58.4 20.0 19.0 61.1
SW Asia 18.0 18.0 63.9 12.5 22.5 65.0
India 9.7 22.6 67.7 16.3 28.6 55.1
Oceania 20.5 15.4 64.1 33.3 11.1 55.6
Exporter Importer
 
Source: Survey of Japanese-Affiliated Firms in ASEAN, India, and Oceania. 
 
 
Table 2. Utilization of FTAs by FTAs: Exports 
Rank Base Country FTA Partner Valid Responses Use FTA %
1 Singapore ASEAN 44 31.8
2 Indonesia Japan 92 21.7
3 Singapore China 44 18.2
4 Australia New Zealand 24 16.7
5 Malaysia ASEAN 101 14.9
6 Thailand ASEAN 262 13.7
7 Malaysia Japan 101 12.9
8 Thailand Japan 262 11.5
9 Singapore Japan 44 11.4
10 Singapore Korea 44 9.1
11 Singapore Australia 44 9.1
12 Philippines ASEAN 102 8.8
13 Vietnam ASEAN 64 7.8
14 Indonesia ASEAN 92 6.5
15 India Thailand 31 6.5
16 Malaysia China 101 5.0  
Source: Survey of Japanese-Affiliated Firms in ASEAN, India, and Oceania 
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Table 3. Reasons for Not Using FTAs (%): Exports 
ASEAN   (n=327) 19.9 37.6 4.0 2.5 4.6 1.5 4.6 22.9 22.6
Indonesia (n=34) 17.7 38.2 2.9 8.8 5.9 2.9 5.9 26.5 35.3
Malaysia (n=55) 23.6 52.7 - - 1.8 - 1.8 14.6 14.6
Myanmar (n=4) - 75.0 25.0 - - - - 25.0 -
Philippines (n=61) 9.8 32.8 4.9 - 3.3 1.6 9.8 21.3 27.9
Singapore (n=15) 6.7 40.0 - 13.3 13.3 6.7 6.7 20.0 26.7
Thailand (n=122) 26.2 32.8 6.6 2.5 6.6 1.6 4.1 22.1 22.1
Vietnam (n=36) 19.4 33.3 - - - - - 38.9 16.7
SW Asia  (n=37) 16.2 18.9 - - - 2.7 2.7 37.8 29.7
India (n=19) 10.5 5.3 - - - 5.3 - 42.1 42.1
Oceania  (n=24) 12.5 29.2 - - - - - 41.7 25.0
COO
procedures
too complex
High cost of
COO
COO hurdle
too high
 Low tariff Tariff exempt Many
different
COO rules
No FTA/EPA
with
destination
Unaware of
FTA/EPA
Other
 
Source: Survey of Japanese-Affiliated Firms in ASEAN, India, and Oceania 
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Table 4. Utilization of FTA by FTAs: Imports 
Rank Base Country FTA Partner Valid Responses Use FTA %
1 Indonesia Japan 94 17.0
2 Malaysia Japan 95 12.6
3 Thailand Japan 253 12.3
4 Thailand ASEAN 253 10.3
5 India Thailand 49 10.2
6 Malaysia ASEAN 95 9.5
7 Vietnam ASEAN 64 9.4
8 Philippines ASEAN 88 8.0
9 Indonesia ASEAN 94 7.4  
Source: Survey of Japanese-Affiliated Firms in ASEAN, India, and Oceania 
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Table 5. Reasons for Not Using FTAs (%): Imports 
ASEAN    (n=321) 48.9 13.4 2.2 0.3 12.8 4.1 13.1 15.9
Indonesia (n=35) 34.3 14.3 - - 11.4 5.7 17.1 31.4
Malaysia (n=55) 45.5 20.0 - 1.8 14.6 3.6 12.7 10.9
Myanmar  (n=5) 20.0 60.0 20.0 - - - 40.0 -
Philippines (n=60) 61.7 8.3 3.3 - 5.0 - 8.3 16.7
Singapore (n=18) - 22.2 5.6 - 22.2 - 16.7 38.9
Thailand (n=113) 51.3 10.6 2.7 - 15.9 8.0 12.4 14.2
Vietnam (n=35) 68.6 8.6 - - 11.4 - 14.3 2.9
SW Asia  (n=47) 29.8 4.3 4.3 - 2.1 4.3 42.6 14.9
India (n=23) 4.4 - 8.7 - 4.4 8.7 47.8 30.4
Oceania  (n=14) - - - - 14.3 7.1 50.0 28.6
Investment
incentive
scheme
Few domestic
sales on
which tariffs
levied
Procurement
sources
unaware of
FTA/EPA
OtherFTA not
applicable to
intermediary
trades
Ordinary
tariffs low
No benefit
from stepwise
FTA
reduction
No FTA/EPA
with source
 
Source: Survey of Japanese-Affiliated Firms in ASEAN, India, and Oceania 
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Table 6. Basic Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FTA 872 0.282 0.450 0 1
Scale 872 5.349 1.426 1.099 11.608
Variance 872 0.060 0.028 0.007 0.109
ExASEAN 872 0.129 0.206 0 1
ExCHINA 872 0.032 0.103 0 1
ExJAPAN 872 0.265 0.347 0 1  
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Probit Results 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI)
Scale 0.175*** 0.169*** 0.170*** 0.172*** 0.158*** 0.154***
[0.040] [0.040] [0.044] [0.045] [0.047] [0.049]
Variance -7.241*** -7.420*** -7.434*** -7.199*** -7.953*** -7.209***
[1.924] [1.942] [2.117] [2.154] [2.370] [2.444]
ExASEAN 0.611** 0.632** 0.321 0.315 0.660** 0.621*
[0.252] [0.251] [0.262] [0.265] [0.315] [0.325]
ExCHINA 1.016** 1.018** 0.802* 0.726 1.032* 0.851
[0.437] [0.437] [0.458] [0.463] [0.533] [0.539]
ExJAPAN 0.348* 0.384** 0.670*** 0.696*** 0.809*** 0.842***
[0.178] [0.178] [0.211] [0.212] [0.238] [0.243]
Year Dummy YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sector Dummy YES NO YES NO YES NO
Country Dummy YES NO YES NO YES NO
Sector*Country NO YES NO YES NO YES
Observations 872 872 674 674 494 493
Pseudo R2 0.1343 0.1423 0.1299 0.1516 0.1311 0.1622  
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. Figures in parentheses 
represent the White consistent standard error. The sample in columns (I) and (II) is restricted solely 
to exporting affiliates. In columns (III) and (IV), the sample is restricted to affiliates with positive 
exports to other ASEAN countries or China, affiliates in Singapore and Malaysia with positive 
exports to Japan, and affiliates in Thailand and Indonesia with positive exports to Japan in 2008. In 
addition to such restrictions, in columns (V) and (VI), we drop affiliates who answered “importers 
are expempted from tariffs” as “reasons for not using FTAs.” 
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Table 8. Results of Country Dummy: Thailand as a Base 
(I) (III) (V)
Malaysia 0.052 -0.051 0.114
[0.145] [0.155] [0.174]
Singapore 0.490** 0.451** 0.314
[0.193] [0.203] [0.221]
Indonesia 0.026 0.095 0.15
[0.161] [0.180] [0.202]
Philippines -0.548*** -0.430** -0.396*
[0.160] [0.190] [0.220]
Vietnam -0.670*** -0.395 -0.329
[0.255] [0.300] [0.341]  
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. Figures in parentheses 
represent the White consistent standard error. The results of the other variables are reported in the 
corresponding columns in Table 7. 
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Table 9. Results of Sector Dummy: Food Sector as a Base 
(I) (III) (V)
Wearing apparel 0.641 0.750 0.875
[0.440] [0.541] [0.605]
Wood products 0.125 0.453 0.101
[0.470] [0.506] [0.529]
Furniture -0.954
[0.626]
Paper products -0.308 -0.295 0.318
[0.563] [0.562] [0.788]
Chemicals -0.17 -0.057 0.108
[0.285] [0.294] [0.313]
Petroleum products 0.575 0.701 1.090*
[0.556] [0.558] [0.635]
Plastic products -0.462 -0.406 -0.192
[0.306] [0.318] [0.344]
Rubber products -0.232 -0.218 -0.058
[0.347] [0.368] [0.397]
Glass and glass products -0.303 -0.210 -0.312
[0.376] [0.416] [0.419]
Basic iron and steel -0.337 -0.200 0.073
[0.344] [0.357] [0.382]
Non-ferrous metals -0.139 0.004 0.381
[0.326] [0.346] [0.385]
Metal products -0.369 -0.286 -0.005
[0.290] [0.304] [0.329]
General machinery -0.368 -0.275 0.001
[0.342] [0.361] [0.394]
Electric machinery -0.363 -0.238 -0.092
[0.278] [0.293] [0.311]
Electric parts -0.938*** -0.963*** -0.681**
[0.297] [0.306] [0.332]
Automobile 0.646 0.918* 1.177**
[0.425] [0.495] [0.541]
Automobile parts 0.314 0.304 0.718**
[0.276] [0.289] [0.317]
Precision machinery -0.889* -0.804 -0.753
[0.524] [0.551] [0.569]
Others -0.459* -0.302 -0.151
[0.271] [0.288] [0.302]  
Notes: ***, **, and * show 1%, 5%, and 10% significance, respectively. In parenthesis is a White 
consistent standard error. The results in the other variables are reported in the corresponding 
columns in Table 7. 
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